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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Bradshaw appeals from the judgment and conviction entered upon the jury 
verdict finding him guilty of felony destruction of evidence. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
Meridian Police Officer Isaiah Wear observed Bradshaw, whom he 
confirmed through his mobile data computer to have a suspended license, drive 
into a parking lot and exit his vehicle. (Trial Tr., p.205, L.18 - p.208, L.2.) Officer 
Wear approached Bradshaw and placed him under arrest. (Trial Tr., p.208, L.13 
- p.211, L.8.) Officer Wear then searched Bradshaw's pockets and placed items 
he found there on the trunk of Bradshaw's car. (Trial Tr., p.213, L.1 - p.215, 
L.6.) 
As Officer Wear was about to put Bradshaw into his patrol car, Bradshaw 
lunged back and grabbed a "clear, plastic wrapped item with a white, powdery 
substance in it" of off the car trunk with his mouth. (Trial Tr., p.215, L.7 - p.216, 
L.19; p.289, Ls.2-17.) Officer Wear and another officer who arrived on scene 
both observed the plastic wrapped "bindle" to be the type typically used to 
transport single doses of cocaine, methamphetamine, or heroin, and the white 
powdery substance to resemble cocaine or methamphetamine. (Trial Tr., p.220, 
L.5 - p.221, L.22; p.236, L.17 - p.239, L.8; p.294, L.18 - p.297, L.2.) The 
officers attempted to extricate the bag from Bradshaw's mouth, but Bradshaw 
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swallowed it before they could retrieve it. (Trial Tr., p.216, Ls.19-20; p.223, LS.5-
15; p.289, L.18 - p.292, L.22.) 
Paramedics arrived and examined Bradshaw. (Trial Tr., p.223, L.19 -
p.224, L.2.) Meanwhile, Officer Wear searched Bradshaw's vehicle. (Trial Tr., 
p.224, Ls.3-7.) Officer Wear did not find any controlled substances, but his drug 
dog indicated the odor of controlled substances on the trunk of the car where the 
bindle had just been. (Trial Tr., p.224, Ls.3-14; p.232, L.20 - p.236, L.6.) 
Officers transported Bradshaw to the hospital, where he refused treatment, and 
then to jail. (Trial Tr., p.255, L.23 - p.256, L.24.) 
The state charged Bradshaw with felony destruction of evidence, resisting 
or obstructing police officers, driving without privileges (3rd offense), 
misdemeanor failure to provide proof of insurance, and the persistent violator 
sentencing enhancement. (R., pp.21-23, 40-41.) The state dismissed the 
insurance charge after Bradshaw subsequently provided proof of valid insurance. 
(See 3/16/12 Tr., p.15, L.11 - p.16, L.3; R., pp.55-56.) After a trial, the jury found 
Bradshaw guilty of all the remaining counts, and the court found that Bradshaw 
was a persistent violator. (Trial Tr., p.401, L.16 - p.402, L.15; p.422, Ls.15-17.) 
The district court imposed a unified 10-year sentence with two years fixed for 
felony destruction of evidence, but retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.1 01-1 04.) The 
court imposed concurrent suspended jail time on each of the misdemeanor 
charges. (ld.) Bradshaw timely appealed. (R., pp.1 06-1 09.) 
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ISSUE 
Bradshaw states the issue on appeal as: 
Was the evidence sufficient to support Mr. Bradshaw's 
conviction for felony destruction of evidence when the statute is 
interpreted using the rule of lenity? 
(Appellant's brief, p.6.) 
The state wishes to rephrase the issue on appeal as: 
Bradshaw's claim that the evidence was insufficient to support his 
conviction rests on his assertion that State v. Peteja, 139 Idaho 607,83 P.3d 781 
(Ct. App. 2003), should be overruled. Should this court decline Bradshaw's 
invitation to overrule State v. Peteja because he has failed to present any 
persuasive justification for doing so? 
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ARGUMENT 
This Court Should Decline Bradshaw's Invitation To Overrule State v. Peteja 
Because Bradshaw Has Failed To Present Any Persuasive Justification For 
Doing So 
A. Introduction 
Bradshaw contends that the state presented insufficient evidence to 
support his conviction for felony destruction of evidence. (See generally 
Appellant's brief.) Recognizing that the controlling statutory interpretation set 
forth by the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Peteja, 139 Idaho 607, 83 P.3d 
781 (Ct. App. 2003), is contrary to his position on appeal, Bradshaw requests this 
Court to overrule Peteja. However, because Bradshaw has failed to present any 
persuasive justification for doing so, this Court should decline his invitation. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Appellate review of the sufficiency of evidence is limited in scope." State 
v. Marsh, 153 Idaho 360, _,283 P.3d 107,112 (Ct. App. 2011). An appellate 
court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon a jury verdict if 
there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could have found 
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Miller, 
131 Idaho 288, 292, 955 P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Reyes, 121 
Idaho 570,826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992). In conducting this review the appellate 
court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to the credibility of 
witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the reasonable inferences 
to be drawn from the evidence. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607; State 
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v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991). Moreover, the facts, 
and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are construed in favor of upholding 
the jury's verdict. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P .2d at 607. 
C. Bradshaw Has Failed To Advance Any Proper Justification For Departing 
From Controlling Idaho Court of Appeals Precedent 
Idaho jurisprudence requires respect for its own precedent. The rule of 
stare decisis dictates that controlling precedent be followed "unless it is 
manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless 
overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy 
continued injustice." State v. Dana, 137 Idaho 6, 9, 43 P.3d 765, 768 (2002); 
State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 660, 8 P.3d 652, 655 (2000) (quoting 
Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72,77,803 P.2d 978, 983 (1990)). 
The standards applicable to the construction of criminal statutes are well-
established: 
The object of statutory interpretation is to give effect to 
legislative intent. The literal words of the statute provide the best 
guide to legislative intent, and therefore, the interpretation of a 
statute must begin with the literal words of the statute. The plain 
meaning of a statute will prevail unless clearly expressed legislative 
intent is contrary or unless the plain meaning leads to absurd 
results.C] This Court gives the words of a statute their plain, usual, 
and ordinary meaning. Moreover, this Court must consider all 
sections of applicable statutes together to determine the intent of 
1 More recently, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that it had "never revised 
or voided an unambiguous statute on the ground that it is patently absurd or 
would produce absurd results when construed as written," and held that it "did 
not have the authority to do so." Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Medical Center, 151 
Idaho 889, 894-896, 265 P.3d 502, 507-509 (2011). In Verska, the Idaho 
Supreme Court did not disavow any of the other standards applicable to the 
construction of criminal statutes discussed in Doe. 
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the legislature. If the language of a statute is capable of more than 
one reasonable construction it is ambiguous. When a statute is 
ambiguous, it must be construed to mean what the legislature 
intended it to mean. To determine that intent, we examine not only 
the literal words of the statute, but also the reasonableness of 
proposed constructions, the public policy behind the statute, and its 
legislative history. 
State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326, 328, 208 P.3d 730, 732 (2009) (citations and 
internal quotations omitted). Additionally, the rule of lenity requires that 
ambiguous criminal statutes should be read narrowly and be construed in favor 
of the defendant. State v. Jones 151 Idaho 943,947,265 P.3d 1155, 1159 (Ct. 
App.2011). 
Pursuant to I.C. § 18-2603, the destruction, alteration or concealment of 
evidence which the individual knows "is about to be produced, used, or 
discovered" upon any "trial proceeding, inquiry or investigation," is a 
misdemeanor offense unless the "trial proceeding, inquiry or investigation is 
criminal in nature and involves a felony offense," in which case the individual is 
guilty of a felony. In Peteja, 139 Idaho at 609-614,83 P.3d at 783-788, the Idaho 
Court of Appeals interpreted the statutory element, "involves a felony offense," as 
requiring the state to prove that the destroyed evidence would have tended to 
demonstrate the commission of a felony. 
On appeal, Bradshaw contends that the evidence presented against him 
at trial was insufficient to prove that the investigation in his case "involve[d] a 
felony offense." (Appellant's brief, pp.7-14.) However, Bradshaw does not 
contend that the state's evidence against him was insufficient to prove this 
element under the interpretation of that element set forth in Peteja. (See 
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Appellant's brief, pp.7-14.) Instead, Bradshaw contends that Peteja was wrongly 
decided and should be overruled. (Appellant's brief, pp.7-14.) 
Specifically, Bradshaw contends that in deciding Peteja, the Idaho Court 
of Appeals erred by considering legislative history and public policy in interpreting 
the legislative intent behind the relevant ambiguous element of I.C. § 18-2603, 
instead of simply construing the statute in his favor pursuant to the rule of lenity. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.7-14.) Under Bradshaw's proposed alternative 
interpretation of I.C. § 18-2603, and pursuant to his application of the rule of 
lenity, an investigation would "involve a felony offense" only if the destruction of 
evidence occurred while a felony investigation was actually in process. 
(Appellant's brief, p.13.) However, Bradshaw's argument fails, and Peteja was 
not wrongly decided, because the rule of lenity does not preclude the type of 
statutory construction of ambiguous criminal statutes utilized in that case. 
In State v. Jones, the Idaho Court of Appeals discussed the relationship 
between the rule of lenity and the utilization of statutory construction to reveal 
legislative intent and interpret ambiguous provisions of statutes: 
The rule of lenity requires that ambiguous criminal statutes 
should be read narrowly and be construed in favor of the 
defendant. However, this rule does not require a court to disregard 
the purpose of a statute when it is clear from the context. Though 
the language in subsection (2) of section 49-1405 may be 
ambiguous when read alone, when examined within context, the 
purpose of the statute is clear. Therefore, this Court is not 
compelled to construe the statute in Jones's favor where that result 
would be contrary to the clear intent of the relevant statute. 
Jones, 151 Idaho at 947, 265 P.3d at 1159; see also Barber v. Thomas, 130 
S.Ct. 2499, 2508-09 (2010) ("[T]he rule of lenity only applies if, after considering 
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text, structure, history, and purpose, there remains a grievous ambiguity or 
uncertainty in the statute such that the Court must simply guess as to what [the 
legislature] intended." (internal quotations and citations omitted)). Therefore, the 
Idaho Court of Appeals was not precluded from reviewing legislative history and 
public policy in interpreting the legislative intent behind I.C. § 18-2603. 
Bradshaw's contrary view of the rule of lenity, if adopted, would not only 
overrule Peteja, it would cast doubt on all Idaho appellate court opinions which 
have engaged in the type of statutory construction of criminal statutes employed 
in that case. Bradshaw has cited no authority that would support such a result. 
To the contrary, as recently as April 2013, the Idaho Supreme Court looked 
beyond the language of a criminal statute to interpret the legislative intent of an 
ambiguous term, and specifically referenced legislative history and public policy 
as types of statutory construction that courts must employ when conducting such 
analyses. State v. Jones, 299 P.3d 219, 225 (2013) (interpreting the term 
"resistance" in I.C. § 18-6101, the Idaho rape statute) . 
. The function and purpose of rule of lenity is not to preclude statutory 
construction of ambiguous statutes, but to prevent courts from enlarging the 
words of a criminal statute to include conduct not clearly proscribed by the 
statute. See In re Dampier, 46 Idaho 195, 267 P. 452 (1928) (recognizing that a 
court cannot "enlarge the words [of a criminal statute] to include other conduct of 
like, equal, or greater atrocity, simply because it may be within the same mischief 
to be remedied, when it is not fairly included in the language of the act" (citations 
omitted)); State v. Thompson, 101 Idaho 430, 437, 614 P.2d 970, 977 (1980) ("A 
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criminal statute must give a clear and unmistakable warning as to the acts which 
will subject one to criminal punishment, and courts are without power to supply 
what the legislature has left vague" (citations omitted)). 
The concern expressed by In re Dampier and Thompson is not 
implicated in the present case. The result of the Idaho Court of Appeals' 
identification of the clear legislative intent behind the phrase "involves a felony 
offense" as it exists in I.C. § 18-2603 did not criminalize any behavior beyond the 
scope of the plain language of that statute. In fact, it is Bradshaw who seeks to 
utilize the rule of lenity to narrow the meaning of "involves a felony offense" to 
include only those felony investigations that are already in progress at the time a 
defendant destroys evidence. 
A court is not required to disregard clear legislative intent of an ambiguous 
criminal statute's meaning just because that intent is revealed through a 
reasoned analysis of legislative history. In Peteja, the Idaho Court of Appeals' 
analysis of the relevant element of I.C. § 18-2603 revealed such a clear 
legislative intent: 
Section 18-2603 originally provided that the destruction of 
evidence was punishable only as a misdemeanor. Then, in 1983, 
the legislature enacted an amendment to section 18-2603 to 
establish the destruction of evidence as a felony offense in certain 
cases. The statement of purpose for the 1983 amendment reflects 
the legislature's intent to make the classification of the destruction 
of evidence offense conform to the classification of the offense for 
which the defendant attempted to evade liability by way of that 
destruction, just as it had brought into conformity the offense 
classification for the crime of witness intimidation under section 18-
2604 and the crime for which the defendant attempted to evade 
liability by way of that intimidation. According to that statement of 
purpose: 
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This bill amends Idaho Code § 18-2603 to 
provide that if a person destroys, conceals, or alters 
evidence, the punishment will be appropriate to the 
crime. Currently, altering, concealing or destroying 
evidence is a misdemeanor. This is so even if the 
evidence would have been used for a felony 
prosecution. It is the belief of the Attorney General's 
Office that if evidence would tend to show a 
defendant had committed a felony, that the 
destruction of that evidence ought also to be a felony. 
Current law encourages a defendant to destroy 
evidence in a felony prosecution in order to incur only 
a misdemeanor conviction. The statute proposed is 
compatible with § 18-2604, Idaho Code, dealing with 
preventing a witness from testifying. 
The public policy underlying statutes criminalizing the 
destruction of evidence is to prevent the obstruction of justice, 
whether permanent obstruction by the destruction of evidence or 
temporary obstruction by the alteration or concealment of the 
evidence, thereby causing the impediment, frustration, or 
unnecessary prolongation of a lawful investigation. Prior to the 
1983 amendment, an individual destroying evidence of a felony 
crime could incur only misdemeanor liability for that destruction. 
With its 1983 amendment, the Idaho legislature intended to close 
this loophole. 
The Attorney General advocated for the passage of the 1983 
amendment in no fewer than four House and Senate Judiciary 
Committee meetings. The statement of purpose for the amendment 
adopted language from the Attorney General's winning argument, 
stating that a felony destruction of evidence offense should accrue 
"if the evidence would tend to show a defendant had committed a 
felony." Although the legislature did not incorporate this "tendency 
to show" language into the statute itself, its inclusion of this 
language in the statement of purpose clarifies its intent as to the 
meaning of the statute's phrase, "involves a felony." It is evident 
the legislature did not intend to institute the restrictive limits 
postulated by Peteja whereby the classification of the destruction of 
evidence offense is fixed forever to the classification of the offense 
targeted by the investigation at its inception. Just as the purpose of 
a traffic stop is not fixed at the time the stop is initiated, neither is 
the purpose of a police investigation fixed upon its inception. Like a 
traffic stop, events continue to unfold during an investigation and, 
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combined with the officer's observations and general inquiries, 
often give rise to legitimate reasons for new lines of inquiry and 
further investigation by an officer. The statutory construction 
advocated by Peteja thus would produce a palpably absurd result. 
In addition, such a construction would operate contrary to the 
legislature's purpose for the 1983 amendment by continuing to 
encourage defendants, by imposing only misdemeanor liability, to 
destroy felony evidence in investigations begun as to misdemeanor 
crimes. 
Instead, we give proper effect to the legislature's intent by 
interpreting the statute to mean that whether the investigation 
"involves a felony offense" depends upon on whether the evidence 
that was destroyed, altered, or concealed would have tended to 
demonstrate the commission of a felony. 
Peteja, 139 Idaho at 611-612, 83 P.3d at 785-786 (emphasis added , citations 
omitted) . 
Thus, not only did the Idaho Court Appeals appropriately reveal the clear 
legislative intent of I.C. § 18-2603, it also found that Peteja's contrary 
interpretation of that statute, which is similar to that advocated for by Bradshaw in 
the present case, was "absurd ." The rule of lenity did not require the Court to 
adopt this absurd interpretation. See Caron v. United States, 524 U.S. 308, 316 
(1998) ("The rule of lenity is not invoked by grammatical possibility. It does not 
apply if the ambiguous reading relied on is an implausible reading of the 
congressional purpose.") (citing United States v. Shabani , 513 U.S. 10, 17 
(1994)). 
Bradshaw has failed show that Peteja was wrongly decided, or otherwise 
advance any proper justification for departing from controlling Idaho Court of 
Appeals precedent. This Court should therefore both decline his invitation to 
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overrule Peteja, and affirm Bradshaw's conviction for felony destruction of 
evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment entered 
upon the jury's verdict finding Bradshaw guilty of felony destruction of evidence. 
DATED this 21th day of May, 2013. 
3R Cz C-'---_ 
MARK W. OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
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